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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of technical efficiency on the optimal exit timing of firms in a 
stochastic dynamic framework. While an extensive literature deals with exit behavior under 
output price uncertainty and efficiency of firms separately, the interplay of these two aspects 
has not yet been examined. Starting from a standard real options approach, we incorporate 
technical efficiency via a production function and derive an optimal price trigger at which 
firms irreversibly exit a market. The profit function in the optimization problem inherits 
properties from the production function by means of a dual Legendre transform. We consider 
two types of production technologies which differ in the way efficiency interacts with the 
primal technology. Assuming separability of efficiency on the primal technology, we show 
that higher efficiency and higher returns to scale make the firm more reluctant to irreversibly 
exit the market. We then extend this model to a case where efficiency is not separable from 
other inputs and derive explicit results from a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Unexpectedly, we find that higher efficiency does not always increase the reluctance to exit if 
firms exhibit low returns to scale.  
Keywords:  efficiency, firm exit, real options 
JEL codes:  D20, D21 
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Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag untersucht im Rahmen eines theoretischen Modells den Einfluss technischer 
Effizienz auf das optimale Timing von Betriebsaufgaben unter Unsicherheit. Die Wirkung der 
Faktoren Unsicherheit und Effizienz auf Betriebsaufgabeentscheidungen wurde in der Litera-
tur bereits ausführlich diskutiert, allerdings nur separat. In dieser Arbeit steht die Analyse der 
Interaktion beider Faktoren im Mittelpunkt. Ausgangspunkt der Modellierung ist ein klassi-
sches Realoptionsmodell, das Irreversibilität und Unsicherheit von Produktpreisen bei der 
Bestimmung von Exit-Triggern berücksichtigt. Technische Effizienz wird über eine Produk-
tionsfunktion eingeführt. Die Eigenschaften der Produktionsfunktion werden durch eine 
Legendre-Transformation auf die Gewinnfunktion des Unternehmens übertragen. Wir be-
trachten zwei Arten von Wechselwirkungen zwischen Effizienzparameter und der Produk-
tionstechnologie: In einem Fall ist technische Effizienz von den Inputfaktoren der Produk-
tionsfunktion separierbar, im anderen Fall dagegen nicht. Während bei Separierbarkeit eine 
höhere Effizienz zu niedrigeren Preistriggern und damit zu einer Verschiebung des optimalen 
Zeitpunkts der Betriebsaufgabe führt ist dieser Zusammenhang bei Nichtseparierbarkeit nicht 
eindeutig. 
Schlüsselwörter: Effizienz, Betriebsaufgabe, Realoptionen 
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1 Introduction 
Decisions to suspend production or exit a market are among the most far-reaching managerial 
decisions. Firms’ exit decisions are dynamic by nature and have to be made in an uncertain 
economic environment. Moreover, it is costly to reverse them. That is, liquidation values for 
specific production assets in place are considerably lower than investment outlays required to 
start production. In view of this irreversibility, firms consider exit decisions carefully and 
usually do not re-enter the market once production has been shut down. Altough the analysis 
of exit decisions is challenging, it is important from a sectoral perspective. Structural change 
in an industry is, in essence, the outcome of aggregated entry and exit decisions of firms. Thus, 
understanding exit behavior of firms is essential to predict the velocity of structural change 
and adjustment processes, which, in turn, affect the competition and the competitiveness of an 
industry. 
Given the relevance of exit decisions, it is not surprising that many attempts have been made 
to explain why and when firms quit, the economic factors that may influence the decision and 
the timing (e.g., Musshoff et al. 2012 and the literature cited therein). Two strands of 
literature are of particular interest for understanding firms’ exit decisions. Given the costly 
reversibility of exit decisions made under uncertain future expectations, the first strand 
encompasses the real options approach which provides a convenient model framework to 
analyze firms’ exit decisions. The second strand of literature relies on efficiency analysis for 
analyzing firms’ decisions to continue or to quit production, based on the undisputed fact that 
firms’ relative performance is crucial for long-run survival. These two fields have received 
extensive attention separately; a joint treatment of these two aspects is the topic of this paper. 
Real options theory is used to analyze irreversible decisions under uncertainty by exploiting 
the analogy between financial options and (dis)investments (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). This 
theory asserts that deferring an exit decision may increase a firm’s profit even if the expected 
present value of cash flows falls below its liquidation value. Shutting down production 
removes the option to benefit from increasing returns in the future; this loss of flexibility must 
be covered by the firm’s liquidation value. Thus, compared with traditional stopping rules, 
lower cash flows are tolerated before it becomes optimal to exit (e.g., Dixit 1989, and 
Odening, Musshoff, and Balmann 2005). This finding has been used to rationalize sluggish 
disinvestment and exit behavior. Real options theory allows for the derivation of hypotheses 
on the impact of economic variables, such as sunk cost, volatility, and flexibility, on the 
timing of firm exit. For example, O’Brien and Folta (2009) consider the impact of uncertainty 
and sunk costs on exit behavior, confirming that uncertainty dissuades firms from exiting only 
when sunk costs are large. 
The efficiency of firms has not yet been considered as a determinant of real option values and 
exit triggers. Heterogeneity of exit triggers among firms is the result of different exposure to 
price risk or differences in the expected profit flow. Clearly, inefficient firms will face lower 
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expected stochastic returns compared to efficient competitors; this difference translates into 
the firm’s optimal exit time. In other words, technical inefficiency is typically implied by the 
specification of the stochastic process of the firm’s future profits. Thus, technical efficiency 
does not enter the real options model as an explicit parameter. Instead, it is merged with other 
model parameters. 
The second relevant strand of literature that is complementary to the real options perspective 
emphasizes the impact of efficiency on firm exit. Goddard et al. (1993) argue that more 
efficient firms show superior performance and are more viable in a competitive environment 
since they earn higher profits and increase their market shares at the expense of less efficient 
firms, thereby increasing industry concentration. This view is often labeled as the efficient 
structure hypothesis and can be traced back to Demsetz (1973). An implication of this 
hypothesis is that efficient and inefficient firms cannot coexist in the long run. The hypothesis 
that technical inefficiency increases the probability of firm exit has been empirically tested. 
Among others, Tsionas and Papadogonas (2006), Kumbhakar, Tsionas, and Sipiläinen (2009), 
and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find a positive correlation between inefficiency and exit. At 
the same time, it can be observed that inefficient firms persist in the market, at least in the 
short run (Emvalomatis, Stefanou, and Lansink 2011). This finding suggests to distinguish 
between short run and long run efficiency, which is emphasized by the concept of dynamic 
efficiency (e.g., Silva and Stefanou 2007 and Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou 2007). Dynamic 
efficiency measurement acknowledges the difference in the adjustment of variable and quasi-
fixed inputs in production. Changes in the level of quasi-fixed factors entail additional costs 
attached to adjusting the capital stock in the long run, such as through foregone outputs. Such 
costs may prevent firms from immediately realizing otherwise optimal investments or disinvest-
ments.1 Dynamic efficiency models usually assume static expectations of revenues and costs 
and thus fail to take into account the value of waiting which underlies the real options model.2 
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to bridge the two aforementioned strands 
of literature. In particular, exit under output price uncertainty is considered while allowing for 
technical inefficiency. We begin from a standard real options model and use a generic produc-
tion function with an efficiency term. We then derive the properties inherited from the original 
production function to the instantaneous profit function by using a dual Legendre transforma-
tion. This allows for the flexible derivation of the substitution properties among multiple 
inputs of the production function in a general setting. We do not impose a priori specific 
functional forms of the production function which may cause inflexibilities among production 
inputs. Depending on how efficiency is assumed to interact with the technology in either a 
separable or non-separable manner, uncertainty impacts firms’ reluctance to exit the market 
differently. In the separable case, efficiency increases the reluctance to exit the market, while 
in the non-separable case, the efficiency parameter interacts directly with the returns to scale 
parameter, resulting in a non-monotonic impact on the optimal exit trigger prices. Very in-
                                                          
1  The notion of adjustment costs is shared with real option models in which these costs are explicitly modeled. 
2  An exception is Hüttel, Narayana, and Odening (2011) who incorporate cost uncertainty into the dynamic 
efficiency model of Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007). 
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efficient firms that have lower returns to scale are found to be more reluctant to exit the 
market than more efficient firms. The paper closest to ours is Lambarraa, Stefanou, and Gil 
(2009) which studies the inefficiency of Spanish olive farmers using a real options approach. 
They consider the effect of inefficiency with a Cobb-Douglas technology and its persistence 
on investment decisions. Nonetheless, the impact of inefficiency on farmers’ exit decision 
under uncertainty is not directly shown. In contrast, our model allows us to rationalize the co-
existence of firms of varying efficiency in the market through the interaction of uncertain 
output price and real options effects. 
In the following section, we present the model without making functional assumptions on the 
way inputs combine to produce output. Homogeneity of the production technology helps in 
exemplifying the intuition of our theory in a simple framework. We then consider exemplarily 
a Cobb-Douglas production function and derive explicit exit conditions for a separable 
efficiency term. Numerical simulations are undertaken to illustrate our theoretical results. The 
third section extends the model to a non-separable efficiency case. The last section concludes. 
2  A model for firm exit decisions under uncertainty and 
inefficiency 
2.1 A general framework 
Our model departs from the standard real options approach suggested by Dixit (1989). In 
contrast to Dixit (1989), we do not consider entry and exit decisions simultaneously and 
instead focus on the optimal timing of the exit decision. That means that we assume an 
existing firm already active in a market that has a potentially infinite life. The firm buys 
inputs ࢞ א Թା௉  at non-stochastic cost ࢝ א Թାା௉  to produce output ݕ that can be sold at 
stochastic price ݌ א Թାା. We are interested in a critical threshold for the stochastic price that 
triggers the firm’s market exit. Output price is assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian 
motion process:  
(1)  ௗ௣௣ ൌ ߙ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ݀ݖ 
where ߙ is the drift rate of the stochastic process, ߪ is its volatility, and ݀ݖ is the increment of 
a Wiener process. At each instant, the firm faces the choice of whether to continue production 
or to leave the market. In the case of continuing, the firm earns a profit flow ߨሺ݌ǡ࢝ሻ where 
ߨǣԹାଵା௉ ՜ Թା. Exit is irreversible and firms have a positive liquidation value ܮ upon exit. 
The decision problem of the firm constitutes an optimal stopping problem that can be solved 
by stochatic dynamic programming techniques. The solution procedure involves two steps. 
First, we have to determine the value of the active firm ܸሺ݌ǡ ݐሻ –which contains the whole 
sequence of operating options – as a function of the stochastic profit flow and thus output 
price. This value implies an optimally adjusted level of variable inputs. Second, we have to 
calculate the option to exit, i.e., to shut down production in exchange for the liquidation value L. 
The optimal exit triggers are derived as part of the solution. 
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The value of the firm at a certain time period ݐ is equal to the sum of the operating profit over 
a short interval time ሺݐǡ ݐ ൅ ݀ݐሻ and the continuation value after time ݐ ൅ ݀ݐ:  
(2)  ܸሺ݌ǡ ݐሻ ൌ ߨሺ݌ǡ࢝ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ܧሺܸሺ݌ ൅ ݀݌ሻ݁ିఘௗ௧ሻ 
where ߩ is an exogenously specified discount rate. 
Applying Ito’s lemma yields the following second order differential equation between the 
value of the firm and the profit flow:3 
(3)  ܸԢሺ݌ሻߙ݌ ൅ ଵଶܸԢԢሺ݌ሻߪଶ݌ଶ െ ߩܸሺ݌ሻ ൅ ߨሺ݌ǡ࢝ሻ ൌ Ͳ. 
In order to link efficiency and exit decision making, there is the need to model the production 
technology explicitly. We first derive the general form of the stochastic profit flow. Except 
for simple functional forms, an explicit solution for the profit function is difficult to attain. To 
circumvent this problem, we use the dual Legendre transformation and derive the structural 
properties of the profit function implicitly (Lau’s chapter in Fuss and McFadden 1978, 
Jorgenson and Lau 1974). Using these findings, we present the impact of efficiency on 
optimal exit behavior if efficiency is modeled in a separable manner in a homogeneous 
production function (in Subsection 2.2). We then provide an illustration of the results for the 
Cobb-Douglas case (in Subsection 2.3) and extend the model to incorporate a non-separable 
efficiency term in the Cobb-Douglas case (in Section 3). 
2.2 Separable efficiency 
We assume the existence of a firm with production function ݂ǣ ݕ ൌ ݂ሺ࢞ሻ with the same 
characteristics as in Lau’s chapter in Fuss and McFadden (1978)4, which transforms a vector 
of inputs ࢞ into a scalar output ݕ, where ݂ǣԹା௉ ՜ Թା. At this stage no further assumptions are 
imposed on the precise functional form of ݂ which adds flexibility to our analysis. 
The short run profit of a firm is defined as:  
(4)  ߨሺ݌ǡ࢝ሻ ൌ ݏݑ݌࢞ሼ݌݂ሺ࢞ሻ െ ሺ࢝ᇱ࢞ሻȁ࢞ א Թା௉ሽ. 
Here, we follow the convention in Lau’s chapter in Fuss and McFadden (1978) and obtain a 
normalized profit function ߨכǣԹା௉ ՜ Թା as:  
(5)  ߨכሺ࢝כሻ ൌ ݏݑ݌࢞ሼ݂ሺ࢞ሻ െ ሺ࢝כᇱ࢞ሻȁ࢞ א Թା௉ሽ 
where input prices are normalized by the output price ݌: ࢝כ ൌ ࢝Ȁ݌. This normalized profit 
function results from the dual Legendre transformation (see Fuss and McFadden (1978) for 
                                                          
3  Since we consider an infinite time horizon problem, time is not a decision variable and will be omitted here-
after. 
4  In particular, ݂ is a finite, non-negative, real-valued, continuous, smooth, twice-continuously differentiable, 
monotonic, concave, and bounded function; inaction is possible. 
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more details). In a further step, the function in (5) is used to derive a profit function to be 
implicitly included in the non-homogeneous part of (3) in the basic set-up of the model. 
Efficiency is introduced in the primal production function through a separable short-term 
production efficiency parameter; as a result, the dual normalized profit function is also 
separable in efficiency. This is achieved through multiplying the production function ݂ሺݔሻ by 
a scalar efficiency parameter ܽ א ሺͲǡͳሿ, where maximum efficiency occurs when ܽ ൌ ͳ. The 
resulting normalized profit function encompasses efficiency:  
(6) ߨ௔כሺ࢝כǡ ܽሻ ൌ ݏݑ݌࢞ሼ݂ܽሺ࢞ሻ െ ሺ࢝כᇱ࢞ሻȁ࢞ א Թା௉ሽ 
where ߨ௔כǣԹାଵା௉ ՜ Թା and where ࢞ depend implicitly on output and input prices, as well as the 
efficiency level. 
One class of production functions that are frequently used in empirical estimates of 
production technologies is the class of homogeneous production functions. While other sets of 
assumptions are possible (see Lau’s chapter in Fuss and McFadden 1978), we exemplify our 
approach with homogeneous production functions. In particular, we assume that the function 
݂ is homogeneous of degree ݇ with respect to inputs with ݇ ൏ ͳ. Accordingly, the normalized 
profit function will be homogeneous of degree െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in the normalized input prices ࢝כ. 
To derive the effect of efficiency, we collect the efficiency terms and define a non-decreasing 
function ݄ǣԹା ՜ Թା. The normalized profit function can then be expressed as:  
(7) ߨ௔כሺ࢝כǡ ܽሻ ൌ ݄ሺܽሻ݃ି௞Ȁሺଵି௞ሻሺ࢝כሻ 
where ݃ି௞Ȁሺଵି௞ሻǣ Թା௉ ՜ Թା is a homogeneous function ݃ of degree െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻ. From 
assumptions on the production function, the non-normalized profit function which includes 
efficiency (ߨ௔) is separable between output and input prices:  
(8) ߨ௔ሺ݌ǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ ൌ ݌ߨ௔כሺ࢝כǡ ܽሻ. 
To express this function in a similar manner as in (7), that is in a multiplicatively separable 
form, we further define two separate functions ݄ଵሺ݌ሻǣ Թା ՜ Թା, and ݃כሺ࢝ሻǣԹା௉ ՜ Թା. The 
non-normalized profit function expressed in multiplicatively separable terms of ݄ሺܽሻǡ ݄ଵሺ݌ሻ 
and ݃כሺ࢝ሻ is given by:  
(9) ߨ௔ሺ݌ǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ ൌ ݃כሺ࢝ሻ݄ሺܽሻ݄ଵሺ݌ሻǤ 
Since the non-normalized profit function is obtained from the normalized profit function by 
multiplying it by ݌, the homogeneity properties of ݃כ with respect to ࢝ (non-normalized input 
prices) are the same as the ones of ݃ with respect to ࢝כ. That is, both are homogeneous of 
degree െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻ. The following Lemma5 derives the degree of homogeneity of the profit 
function in output price. 
                                                          
5  The proof, similar to Lau’s chapter in Fuss and McFadden (1978) and Kumbhakar (2001), can be found in 
the Appendix. 
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Lemma A profit function of the type ߨ௔ሺ݌ǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ homogeneous of degree െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in 
input prices ࢝ will be homogeneous of degree ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in output price ݌. 
Given the above Lemma, ݄ଵሺ݌ሻ is a homogeneous function of degree ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ. In a further 
step, we summarize ݃כሺ࢝ሻ and ݄ሺܽሻ in a multiplicative factor ܺ ൌ ݃כሺ࢝ሻ݄ሺܽሻ. The profit 
function (9) is rewritten in terms of ܺ and reduces to a multiplication of two terms:  
(10) ߨ௔ሺ݄ଵሺ݌ሻǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ ൌ ݄ܺଵሺ݌ሻ. 
To be more general, we rewrite ݄ଵሺ݌ሻ as a function of a positive constant ߣ such that ݄ଵሺ݌ሻ ൌ
݄ଵሺߣ݌ሻȁఒୀଵ . The profit function that captures the efficiency of the firm is expressed in a 
compact multiplicative form:  
(11) ߨ௔ሺ݄ଵሺ݌ሻǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ ൌ ݄ܺଵሺߣ݌ሻȁఒୀଵ. 
In the next step, we incorporate the profit function (11) that accounts for a separable 
efficiency term into the optimality conditions of an active firm (equation 3). The value of an 
active firm in terms of the enhanced profit function is:  
(12) ܸԢሺ݌ሻߙ݌ ൅ ଵଶܸԢԢሺ݌ሻߪଶ݌ଶ െ ߩܸሺ݌ሻ ൅ ߨ௔ሺ݄ଵሺߣ݌ሻǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ ൌ Ͳ. 
Following Dixit (1989), the solution of the non-homogeneous second order differential 
equation (12) is given by:  
(13) ܸሺ݌ሻ ൌ ܤଵ݌ఉభ ൅ ܤଶ݌ఉమ ൅ ௣ܸሺ݌ሻ݌ ൐ ݌כ 
where ݌כ is the price level that triggers an irreversible exit from the market. That is, if the 
market price ݌ falls below the trigger price, the firm will optimally leave the market. The 
decision maker waits until the net worth of the firm is lower than the liquidation value (ܮ) to 
exit the market. This will be made explicit in the following steps. 
Attempting a solution of the type ଵ݄ܺଵሺߣ݌ሻ we obtain:  
(14) ௣ܸሺ݌ሻ ൌ ௑ఒ
భȀሺభషೖሻ௛భሺ௣ሻ
ఋᇱ  
where ߜԢ ൌ ߩ െ ఈఒሺଵି௞ሻ െ
௞ఙమ
ଶఒమሺଵି௞ሻమ is a risk adjusted discount rate. ߚଵ and ߚଶ are the positive 
and negative roots of the quadratic equation, respectively, associated with the second order 
differential equation (12). Further assuming that ݄ଵ is homogeneous of degree ߛ, the 
fundamental quadratic equation in this case is equivalent to:  
(15) ܳሺߛሻ ൌ ఈఊఒ ൅
ఊሺఊିଵሻఙమ
ଶఒమ െ ߩ ൌ Ͳ. 
The positive root of the fundamental quadratic is  
(16) ߚଵ ൌ ଵଶ െ
ఈఒ
ఙమ ൅ ൜ቂ
ఈఒ
ఙమ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ
ଶ ൅ ʹ ఘఒమఙమ ൠ
ଵȀଶ
. 
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The negative root is  
(17) ߚଶ ൌ ଵଶ െ
ఈఒ
ఙమ െ ൜ቂ
ఈఒ
ఙమ െ
ଵ
ଶቃ
ଶ ൅ ʹ ఘఒమఙమ ൠ
ଵȀଶ
. 
Ruling out bubble solutions, ܸሺ݌ሻ becomes:  
(18) ܸሺ݌ሻ ൌ ௑ఒభȀሺభషೖሻ௛భሺ௣ሻఋᇱ  
ߜԢ can be recognized as the negative of the fundamental quadratic (15), evaluated at ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ. 
Because we need to assume that ߜԢ ൐ Ͳ, the negative of the fundamental quadratic evaluated 
at ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ needs to be positive. That is, ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ is between the two roots of the 
fundamental quadratic.  
Since we focus on the exit strategy, we require ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ ൐ ߚଶ which amounts to a restriction 
on the degree of homogeneity of the production function ሺߚଶ െ ͳሻȀߚଶ ൐ ݇. 
The value of the option ሺܨሻ for an active firm is equal to the sum of the values of the exit 
option and the value of the active firm ܸሺ݌ሻ in (18):  
(19) ܨሺ݌ሻ ൌ ܣଵ݌ఉభ ൅ ܣଶ݌ఉమ ൅ ௑ఒ
భȀሺభషೖሻ௛భሺ௣ሻ
ఋᇱ ݌ ൐ ݌כ. 
The value of the option to exit is given by the first two terms in the right-hand side of the 
above equation, ܣଵ݌ఉభ ൅ ܣଶ݌ఉమ. The value of the exit option will be zero if prices are high 
enough since there is no incentive for the firm to leave the market. Consequently, the constant 
ܣଵ associated with the positive root ߚଵ should be zero implying that  
(20) ܨሺ݌ሻ ൌ ܣଶ݌ఉమ ൅ ௑ఒ
భȀሺభషೖሻ௛భሺ௣ሻ
ఋᇱ ݌ ൐ ݌כ. 
To solve for the trigger price level ݌כ and the constant ܣଶ, we invoke the value matching 
condition:  
(21) ܨሺ݌כሻ ൌ ܮ 
and the smooth pasting condition:  
(22) ܨԢሺ݌כሻ ൌ ͲǤ 
This yields:  
(23) ܣଶ ൌ െ ఒ
ೖ
భషೖ௑ப௛భሺ௣כሻȀப௣כ௣כ
ఋᇱఉమ௣כഁమ
Ǥ 
Inserting (23) into (20), what we obtain into (21), and then rearranging gives an implicit 
definition for the trigger price:  
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(24) ݃כሺ࢝ሻ݄ሺܽሻ݄ଵሺߣ݌כሻ ൌ ߜԢܮ ቆ ఉమఒఉమఒି భభషೖቇ . 
The optimality condition (24) states that the instantaneous profit on the left-hand side must 
equal the appropriately discounted liquidation value ሺߜԢܮሻ, times a multiple ቆ ఉమఒఉమఒି భభషೖቇ, which 
is lower than unity. Equation (24) shows that the exit price trigger decreases in ܽ. That is, 
more efficient firms have a comparatively lower exit trigger compared to less efficient ones. 
Thus, reluctance to irreversibly leave the market increases for more efficient firms. 
The degree of homogeneity of the production function (݇) has an impact on the level of exit 
trigger prices ݄ଵሺߣ݌כሻ. In particular, an increase in ݇ in (24) decreases both the multiplier of 
liquidation value ܮ and ߜԢ, implying a higher reluctance of firms who have a higher degree of 
homogeneity in inputs. However, the effect of ݇ on the level of exit trigger prices can be 
different depending on the specification of the production function. 
2.3  Simulations 
To quantify the aforementioned effects, we construct an illustrative example. A simple type of 
production technology that responds to the properties considered here is Cobb-Douglas. For 
exemplification purposes, we use a production function6 with one input (P=1) and one output:  
(25) ݂஼஽ሺݔሻ ൌ ݔఏ 
where ݂஼஽ǣԹା ՜ Թା. Observed output ݕ is less than or equal to the maximum producible 
output:  
(26) ݕ ൌ ݂஼஽݄ሺ݁ିథሻ ൌ ݂஼஽݁ିథ ൌ ݔఏ݁ିథ 
where ߶ א ሾͲǡλሻ is an inefficiency parameter, so that ܽ ൌ ݁ିథ can be considered an efficiency 
term which is separable from input ݔ and output ݕ.7 The Cobb-Douglas technology results in 
a separable profit function. Since efficiency enters in a multiplicatively separable way in the 
production function, the efficiency term is also multiplicatively separable in the dual profit 
function:  
(27) ߨథሺ݌ǡݓǡ ߶ሻ ൌ ݁ି
ഝ
భషഇሺͳ െ ߠሻ ቀఏ௪ቁ
ഇ
భషഇ ݌ భభషഇ  
where ߨథǣԹାଷ ՜ Թା. For a derivative method to identify a maximum for profit, second order 
conditions impose that ߠ ൑ ͳ, implying non-increasing returns to scale on the production 
function.8 
                                                          
6  In particular, we omit the dependence on returns to scale parameter ߠ because it is a given parameter that 
shapes the production function. 
7  In this context, an extension to multiple inputs is possible under the assumption that the efficiency parameter 
enters as a shifter of the whole production function, equally contracting efficient output across inputs. 
8  For a well-defined solution, we require ߠ ൏ ͳ. 
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Noticing that for the Cobb-Douglas case, ߣ ൌ ͳ, degree of homogeneity of the production 
function ݇ is equal to ߠ, ߛ ൌ ଵଵିఏ, ݄ଵሺߣ݌ሻ ൌ ݌ఊ, and ݃כሺݓሻ݄ሺ݁ିథሻ ൌ ݁
ି ഝభషഇሺͳ െ ߠሻ ቀఏ௪ቁ
ഇ
భషഇ, 
we obtain the following equation for the trigger price as a special case of (24):  
(28) ݁ି ഝభషഇሺͳ െ ߠሻ ቀఏ௪ቁ
ഇ
భషഇ ݌כ
భ
భషഇ ൌ ߜԢȁఒୀଵܮ ቆ ఉమఉమି భభషഇቇ.  
Apparently, the efficiency term affects net worth only, i.e., efficiency acts simply as a shifter 
of trigger prices under the assumption of multiplicative separability. For ߶ ൌ Ͳ, equation (28) 
reduces to the standard real options exit trigger price with variable output (Dixit and Pindyck 
1994). More inefficient firms are less reluctant to exit the market. In adding more flexibility to 
their standard model, Dixit (1989) recognized that exit, in the case of variable output, would 
be at lower levels than usually predicted in the case of investment under uncertainty. The 
inclusion of efficiency tends to counteract this reduction in exit trigger prices by shifting up 
trigger price levels for more inefficient firms. 
Equation (28) can be solved for ݌כ. The outcome is illustrated in Fig. 1 to 3 for different 
parameter constellations which will be introduced below. The aim of these simulations is to 
illustrate, for a population of simulated firms (number of firms on the vertical axis), the 
interaction between efficiency, uncertainty (volatility of output price), and exit trigger prices 
(on the horizontal axis). 
To simulate the triggers, we randomly draw a pseudo-random univariate normal deviate 
10,000 times, which is undertaken to simulate the returns to scale parameter of a population of 
production units.9 The returns to scale parameters are normally distributed with mean ͲǤͷ and 
standard deviation ͲǤͲ͹, so that most simulated units (99.74%) have a returns to scale 
parameter between ͲǤʹͻ and ͲǤ͹ͳ. 
In each figure: the upper plot shows results for ߶ ൌ ͲǤ͹, which corresponds to a lower level of 
efficiency of approximately 50%; the middle plot show results for ߶ ൌ ͲǤͶ, which represents 
a medium level of efficiency of almost 67%; and, the lower plot shows results for ߶ ൌ ͲǤͳ, 
which corresponds to a higher level of efficiency, i.e., 90%. The drift rate of the uncertain 
output price is null in these simulations. An overview of the other simulation parameters is 
provided in Table 1.  
Table 1.  Simulation parameters for the separable efficiency Cobb-Douglas case  
  Parameters  
Fig. 1  L=1, w=0.01, ߪ= {0.02, 0.09}  
Fig. 2  L={1, 4}, w=0.01, ߪ= 0.02  
Fig. 3  L=1, w={0.01, 0.015}, ߪ= 0.02  
                                                          
9  Note that we do not want to derive in this instance an industry-wide equilibrium and instead  aim to see how 
single heterogeneous firms react to price risk. 
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In Fig. 1, we consider production units that have a liquidation value normalized to 1 and an 
input cost fixed at 0.01.10 In all plots in this figure, we vary the level of volatility from a low 
level of ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ to a medium level of ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲͻ. The resulting distributions from varying the 
level of volatility for each level of efficiency are plotted as two overlapping histograms: for 
each plot, the histograms on the left (right)correspond to higher (lower) price volatility. 
Fig. 1. Exit trigger prices for separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with simulated returns to scale for different levels of output price 
volatility and efficiency 
 
Note:  Parameters: ܮ ൌ ͳ, ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ, ߪ ൌ ሼͲǤͲͻǡͲǤͲʹሽ, and ߠ̱ܰሺͲǤͷǡͲǤͲͲͶͻሻ. Volatility ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲͻ (left 
histogram) and ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ (right histogram). Efficiency: ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤͶͻ͹ (upper panel), ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤ͸͹ (middle 
panel), and ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤͻ (lower panel). Sample size: 10,000. One observation was excluded to avoid negative ߜԢ.  
 
For a given efficiency level, the higher the volatility is the more reluctant firms are to exit. 
This is a standard result of real options theory. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
impact of efficiency depends on the level of price volatility. The higher the price risk, the 
lower is the impact of efficiency on the optimal price trigger. Looking at the left histograms, 
                                                          
10  When increasing returns to scale ߠ for an input level greater than 1, an increasing marginal product calls for 
decreasing trigger prices if the input cost ݓ is fixed. A decreasing marginal product, however, calls for 
increasing trigger prices if the input level is less than 1. In these simulations, we only use levels of input cost 
that ensure that input levels in correspondence of the trigger prices are greater than 1. 
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we see a lower shift to the left when there is more efficiency. That is, in a more volatile 
market one can expect to find a higher heterogeneity of firms with respect to their efficiency, 
at least in the short run.11 The graph also shows that different firms can coexist in the market 
at a given exit trigger price for different efficiency levels. If only firms more efficient than a 
certain threshold were to be in the market for a given output price, then distributions of exit 
trigger prices shall not overlap for the same volatility level. 
In Fig. 2, we consider what occurs when we vary the liquidation value of the production unit 
from 1 to 4 while keeping input cost fixed at 0.01. To isolate the effect of a varying 
liquidation value, we keep low the level of output price volatility, ߪ, at 0.02. At each level of 
efficiency, we obtain two distributions of trigger prices for each level of the liquidation value: 
for each plot the histograms on the left correspond to the lower liquidation value and the 
histograms on the right correspond to higher liquidation value. Higher liquidation values 
reduce the reluctance to leave the market.  
Fig. 2.  Exit trigger prices for separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with simulated returns to scale for different levels of liquidation 
value and efficiency levels 
 
Note:  Parameters: ܮ ൌ ሼͳǡͶሽ, ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ, volatility ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ, and ߠ̱ܰሺͲǤͷǡͲǤͲͲͶͻሻ. ܮ ൌ ͳ (left histogram) and 
ܮ ൌ Ͷ (right histogram). Efficiency: ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤͶͻ͹ (upper panel), ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤ͸͹ (middle panel), and ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤͻ 
(lower panel). Sample size: 10,000.  
                                                          
11  This conclusion abstracts from liquidity aspects that may force firms to quit production. 
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In addition to shifting the distribution of exit trigger prices to the right, the higher liquidation 
value results in more heterogeneous reactions by firms. In particular, the reactions of less 
efficient firms are more heterogeneous than those by more efficient firms. The exit trigger 
prices for more efficient firms are more concentrated. 
In Fig. 3, we consider the impact of different unit costs on exit trigger prices. We vary unit 
costs from 0.01 to 0.015 while the keeping liquidation value of the production units fixed at 1. 
In addition, we keep the level of volatility of output price at ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ. 
Fig. 3.  Exit trigger prices for separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with simulated returns to scale for different levels of unit costs and 
efficiency levels 
 
Note: Parameters: ܮ ൌ ͳ, ݓ ൌ ሼͲǤͲͳǡͲǤͲͳͷሽ, volatility ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ, and ߠ̱ܰሺͲǤͷǡͲǤͲͲͶͻሻ. ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ (left 
histogram) and ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳͷ (right histogram). Efficiency: ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤͶͻ͹ (upper panel), ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤ͸͹ 
(middle panel), and ݁ିథ ൌ ͲǤͻ (lower panel). Sample size: 10,000.  
 
For each plot, the histograms on the left (right) correspond to lower (higher) unit cost. Higher 
unit cost reduces the reluctance to exit the market irreversibly. Efficiency substantially 
influences firms that should be present in the market. In particular, it reduces the dispersion of 
trigger prices at which firms exit. More efficient firms tend to exit at more similar exit trigger 
price levels. Less efficient firms exit first, more efficient ones stay longer in the market. 
To summarize the above scenarios, with increasing efficiency we find a monotonic decrease 
of exit trigger prices at varying degrees. This implies higher inertia for more efficient units. 
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3  Model extension: non-separable efficiency 
In this section, we show that the relation between efficiency and exit in the separable case 
cannot be generalized with the same strength if efficiency is included in a non-separable manner 
in the production technology. A single multiplicative efficiency term restricts efficiency to act 
only as a shifter with respect to all production factors (Orea and Álvarez 2006). It also implies 
a unitary elasticity of output with respect to the efficiency term. 
A natural extension is to include a non-multiplicative efficiency term. A non-multiplicative 
efficiency implies that efficiency cannot be separated from the inputs and output in determining 
the level of trigger prices. By assuming a specific functional form for non-separable efficiency 
and the production function, in a very simple framework we show that under decreasing 
returns to scale it is possible that less efficient firms are more reluctant to exit the market than 
more efficient ones.  
3.1  Non-separable efficiency and Cobb-Douglas technology 
In this subsection, we again use a Cobb-Douglas technology with one input to derive the 
optimal exit trigger prices. However, we now assume that the production function is directly 
transformed by efficiency. We rely on a Box-Cox transformation (Box and Cox 1964), but 
other transformations would also be possible. The observed output transformed by efficiency is: 
(29) ݕ ൌ ሺ௙಴ವሺ௫ሻሻ഍ିଵక ൌ
ሺ௫ഇሻ഍ିଵ
క  
where ߦ א ሺͲǡͳሻ is considered in this case as an efficiency parameter. The profit function then 
takes the form:  
(30) ߨకሺ݌ǡ ݓǡ ߦሻ ൌ ݌ି
భ
഍ഇషభݓ
഍ഇ
഍ഇషభ ቌቀଵకቁ ቀ
ଵ
ఏቁ
഍ഇ
഍ഇషభ െ ቀଵఏቁ
భ
഍ഇషభቍ െ ௣క 
where ߨకǣԹାଷ ՜ Թା. 
Second order conditions for a maximum impose that for a well-defined solution, ߦߠ ൏ ͳ. 
Different combinations of returns to scale and efficiency can satisfy ߦߠ ൏ ͳ.12 To simplify the 
notation, we rewrite (30) as:  
(31) ߨకሺ݌ǡ ݓǡ ߦሻ ൌ ܭ݌ఎ െ ܦ݌ 
where ߟ ൌ െ ଵఏకିଵ, ܭ ൌ
௪భషആఏആ
ఎିଵ , and ܦ ൌ
ఎఏ
ఎିଵ 
13. With this profit function, the value of the active 
firm should satisfy the following second order differential equation, which is analogous to (12):  
                                                          
12  In particular, either ߠ ൏ ͳȀߦ or ߦ ൏ ͳȀߠ. 
13  The second term െܦ݌ is mainly present because of the normalization present in the Box-Cox transformation 
used to provide continuity at 0. Without this, the first term most important for our results is still present. 
14 Simone Pieralli, Silke Hüttel and Martin Odening 
SiAg-Working Paper 14 (2013); HU Berlin 
(32) ܸԢሺ݌ሻߙ݌ ൅ ଵଶܸԢԢሺ݌ሻߪଶ݌ଶ െ ߩܸሺ݌ሻ ൅ ܭ݌ఎ െ ܦ݌ ൌ Ͳ. 
Undertaking the same steps as in the previous section, we attain the following expression for 
the optimal exit trigger price:  
(33) ௄௣כ
ആ
ఎᇱ ൌ ܮ
ఉమ
ఉమିఎ ൅
ሺଵାఈିఘሻ஽௣כ
ఎᇱ
ఉమିଵ
ఉమିఎ 
where ߟԢ ൌ ߩ െ ߙߟ െ ͳȀʹߪଶߟሺߟ െ ͳሻ is a risk adjusted discount rate. The left-hand side of 
equation (33) is the usual value of the net worth of the project appropriately discounted. The 
first term of the right-hand side is the fraction of the exit value ܮ that can be recovered upon 
exit from the market. This is very similar to the separable case apart from the influence of 
efficiency term ߦ on ߟ. 
In additional, there is another term14 ሺଵାఈିఘሻ஽௣כఎᇱ , which rearranged is 
ሺଵାఈିఘሻ௣כఎఏ
ఎᇱሺఎିଵሻ  and finally 
ሺଵାఈିఘሻ௣כ
కఎᇱ . This shows how efficiency and the price level interact directly. If ߦߠ ൏ ͳ then ߟ is 
greater than 1 and ఉమିଵఉమିఎ is lower than unity. Substituting back into ܭ and ܦ and rearranging 
terms, we obtain:  
(34) ଵఎᇱ ቀ
௣כആ௪భషആఏആ
ఎିଵ െ
ሺଵାఈିఘሻ௣כఎఏ
ఎିଵ
ఉమିଵ
ఉమିఎቁ െ ܮ
ఉమ
ఉమିఎ ൌ Ͳ. 
Applying the chain rule allows us to see how efficiency affects (34). The derivative of ߟ with 
respect to ߦ is positive ఏሺଵିకఏሻమ. Accordingly, the sign of the derivative of equation (34) with 
respect to ߦ15 will be the same as the sign of the derivative of (34) with respect to ߟ, given that 
ߟ ൐ ͳ. The latter derivative is:  
(35) ଵఎᇲ ቆ
௣כആ௪భషആఏആ
ఎିଵ ቀ݌כ ൅ ݓ ൅ ߠ െ
ଵ
ఎିଵቁ െ
ሺଵାఈିఘሻ௣כሺఉమିଵሻ
ሺఉమିఎሻሺఎିଵሻ ቀ
ିఏ
ఎିଵ ൅
ఏఎ
ఉమିఎቁቇ ൅ 
ቀ஑ାቀ஗ିభమቁ஢మቁ
ሺఎᇲሻమ ൬
݌כߟݓͳെߟߠߟ
ߟെͳ െ
ሺͳ൅ߙെߩሻ݌כߟߠ
ߟെͳ
ߚʹെͳ
ߚʹെߟ
൰ െ ܮ ఉమሺఉమିఎሻమ ൌ Ͳ. 
The signs in the first term of the derivative are positive except for ݌כ ൅ ݓ ൅ ߠ െ ଵఎିଵ. 
The first part of the second term 
ቀ஑ାቀ஗ିభమቁ஢మቁ
ሺఎᇲሻమ  is positive. The sign depends on the second part 
ቀ௣כ
ആ௪భషആఏആ
ఎିଵ െ
ሺଵାఈିఘሻ௣כఎఏ
ఎିଵ
ఉమିଵ
ఉమିఎቁ which can be recognized as a modified net worth of the project 
which by (33) shall be positive. In general, the whole derivative can be negative. In particular, 
for low values of the returns to scale parameter ߠ, lower efficiency can be linked to higher 
reluctance to exit. Under decreasing returns, very low efficient firms can be more reluctant to 
exit than more efficient ones. On the other hand, for higher values of ߠ, reluctance increases 
with efficiency. 
                                                          
14  Again, it is to be stressed that if we were to adopt other forms of non-separable efficiency terms, this result 
may not persist exist. 
15  We note here that the sign of the derivative with respect to ߠ is also the same. 
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3.2  Simulations 
To illustrate the difference with the separable case in the previous section, we propose simula-
tions that show the relationship between uncertainty, trigger prices, and a non-separable efficiency 
term. We illustrate the result by means of numerical simulations using similar parameter settings 
as in the separable case. Fig. 4 depicts the impact of efficiency under different levels of price 
risk (parameters: L=1, w=0.01, ߠ= 0.5, ߪ= {0.02, 0.2}). Here, we find a non-monotonic 
relationship for very low values of efficiency. This happens when very low levels of 
efficiency interact with low levels of returns to scale, which makes the degree of homogeneity 
of the function very low.  
Fig. 4.  Exit trigger prices for non-separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with different levels of efficiency and levels of output price volatility 
for a medium returns to scale function 
 
Note: Parameters: ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ, ߠ ൌ ͲǤͷ, and volatility level of output prices vary from ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ to ߪ ൌ ͲǤʹ.  
 
In the following, we simulate a population of firms where the returns to scale parameter is 
simulated as in the separable case. To ease comparisons, for different levels of efficiency we 
have, as in the separable case, in each figure: in the upper plot ߦ ൌ ͲǤͷ, in the middle plot 
ߦ ൌ ͲǤ͹, and in the lower plot ߦ ൌ ͲǤͻ. An overview of the simulations parameters are 
provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2.  Simulation parameters for the non-separable efficiency Cobb-Douglas case 
 Parameters  
Fig. 5  L=1, w=0.01, ߪ= {0.02, 0.09}  
Fig. 6  L={1, 4}, w=0.01, ߪ= 0.02  
Fig. 7  L=1, w={0.01, 0.015}, ߪ= 0.02  
 
Fig. 5 shows two series of overlapping histograms: in each plot, the histograms on the left corre-
spond to higher volatility of prices (ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲͻ) and the histograms on the right correspond to 
lower volatility of prices (ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ). Overall, the figures show a slight decrease of exit trigger 
prices when volatility increases for given level of efficiency. In this non-separable case, even 
more markedly, efficiency does not seem to discriminate between firms that should be in or 
out of the market.  
Fig. 5.  Exit trigger prices for non-separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with simulated returns to scale for different levels of volatility of 
output price and efficiency levels 
 
Note:  Parameters: ܮ ൌ ͳ, ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ, ߪ ൌ ሼͲǤͲͻǡͲǤͲʹሽ, and ߠ̱ܰሺͲǤͷǡͲǤͲͲͶͻሻ. Volatility ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲͻ (left histo-
gram) and ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ (right histogram). Efficiency: ߦ ൌ ͲǤͷ (upper panel), ߦ ൌ ͲǤ͹ (middle panel), and 
ߦ ൌ ͲǤͻ (lower panel). Sample size: 10,000. Greater shifts toward left appear for a higher change in value 
of price risk, signaling higher reluctance to exit in the presence of higher price risk. 
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In Fig. 6, we consider varying the liquidation value, as in the separable case, between 1 and 4. 
For each level of efficiency, for each plot the histograms on the left (right) correspond to a 
lower (higher) liquidation value. A higher liquidation value reduces reluctance to irreversibly 
exit the market. As in the separable case, with increases in liquidation values, exit trigger 
prices are more diversified.  
Fig. 6. Exit trigger prices for non-separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with simulated returns to scale for different levels of liquidation value 
and efficiency levels 
 
Note:  Parameters: ܮ ൌ ሼͳǡͶሽ, ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ, ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ, and ߠ̱ܰሺͲǤͷǡͲǤͲͲͶͻሻ. Liquidation value ܮ ൌ ͳ (left 
histogram) and ܮ ൌ Ͷ (right histogram). Efficiency: ߦ ൌ ͲǤͷ (upper panel), ߦ ൌ ͲǤ͹ (middle panel), and 
ߦ ൌ ͲǤͻ (lower panel). Sample size: 10,000.  
 
In Fig. 7, we consider the effect of varying unit costs from 0.01 to 0.015 on exit trigger prices. 
For each plot, the histograms on the left (right) correspond to lower (higher) unit cost. Higher 
unit cost reduces reluctance to irreversibly exit the market. While we notice a clear effect on 
trigger prices due to higher unit costs among firms with similar efficiency levels, for the same 
level of costs we only notice a slight shift towards lower trigger prices when increasing 
efficiency. The efficiency effect seems less important when considered in a non-separable 
framework. 
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Fig. 7.  Exit trigger prices for non-separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with simulated returns to scale for different levels of unit costs and 
efficiency levels 
 
Note:  Parameters: ܮ ൌ ͳ, ݓ ൌ ሼͲǤͲͳǡͲǤͲͳͷሽ, and ߪ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ, ߠ̱ܰሺͲǤͷǡͲǤͲͲͶͻሻ. Input price ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ (left histo- 
gram) and ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳͷ (right histogram). Efficiency: ߦ ൌ ͲǤͷ (upper panel), ߦ ൌ ͲǤ͹ (middle panel), and 
ߦ ൌ ͲǤͻ (lower panel). Sample size: 10,000. 
 
In Fig. 8, we illustrate more specifically the interaction of the level of volatility with the effect 
of increasing liquidation value. In particular, we note that reduction in reluctance (i.e., an 
increase in exit trigger prices) due to changes in liquidation value is much more pronounced 
for lower volatility levels than for higher ones. Higher volatility reduces the importance of the 
change in liquidation value. 
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Fig. 8.  Exit trigger prices for non-separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for high and low liquidation (exit) values, across different efficiency 
levels and levels of output price volatility 
 
Note:  Parameters: ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ, ߠ ൌ ͲǤͷ, and liquidation value varies from ܮ ൌ ͳ to ܮ ൌ Ͷ.  
 
Similarly, in Fig. 9 we show that the increase in exit trigger prices due to an equal increase in 
unit costs is proportionally lower for higher volatility levels.  
Fig.9.  Exit trigger prices for non-separable efficiency in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function for high and low unitary costs, across different efficiency levels and 
for levels of output price volatility 
 
Note:  Parameters: ܮ ൌ ͳ, ߠ ൌ ͲǤͷ, and input cost varies from ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳ to ݓ ൌ ͲǤͲͳͷ. 
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4  Conclusions 
In this paper, we develop a model to include production efficiency in the evaluation of the exit 
behavior of firms when subject to a stochastic output price that follows a Geometric Brownian 
motion process. We do so by directly modeling the technological structure of a production 
firm and implicitly deriving a dual profit function through a Legendre transformation without 
assuming a functional form. 
To exemplify this methodology, without assuming a specific functional form of the production 
function, a general class of results for homogeneous production functions is derived with an 
efficiency term separable from the rest of the production factors. More efficient firms are 
more reluctant to exit the market, believing in their potential to be profitable again if prices 
increase. Firms with a higher degree of homogeneity in inputs are generally more reluctant to 
irreversibly exit the market, even though this result depends on the chosen class of production 
functions. 
These results are supported by analytical results derived for the exemplifying case of a Cobb-
Douglas technology under separability of efficiency. Higher efficiency increases reluctance to 
exit from the market. Differently efficient production units with different returns to scale can 
coexist at a level of output price under the conditions developed in this study. Depending on 
the level of efficiency, volatility differently affects exit trigger prices.  
We develop a set of numerical simulations for the specific Cobb-Douglas case to support the 
theoretical findings about the behavior of exit trigger prices under different efficiency levels 
and returns to scale. As expected, in the separable case lower efficiency increases the exit 
trigger prices, which raises the incentive to exit the market. 
We then derive the case when the efficiency term is non-separable in a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology. Higher efficiency does not always increase reluctance to exit when very low returns to 
scale are present. In the numerical simulations for the non-separable case, because efficiency 
interacts directly with the returns to scale parameter, it has a less strong and not necessarily 
monotonic relationship with exit trigger prices. It seems that efficiency has a lower effect on 
exit trigger prices under non-separability because efficiency and returns to scale are, in a 
sense, substitutable in our model. 
Finally, some classical results of theory of investment under uncertainty are common to all of 
our numerical simulations. In particular, while volatility increases reluctance to exit the market, 
higher unitary costs and higher liquidation values decrease the reluctance to irreversibly exit 
the market. 
It is important to stress that our framework proposes a general methodology. Derived results 
are just an example of the possible assumptions on the primal technology that could result in 
different dual profit functions. Nonetheless, our example is general enough to show how 
efficiency can be included in a structural manner into the technology to derive firm exit 
behavior without assuming a specific production functional form. 
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The question of whether efficiency works as a shifter on the exit trigger or whether efficiency 
is non-monotonically related to the exit trigger and, if so, how it interrelates with price 
uncertainty needs to be answered using firm data. For example, one could use a two-stage 
procedure. In a first stage, the firm specific efficiency could be measured using standard 
approaches like a stochastic frontier analysis or data envelopment analysis. In a second stage, 
the predicted technical efficiency could then enter a binary choice model (stay or exit) or a 
hazard rate model as explanatory variable. Alternatively, firm specific efficiency and the 
likelihood of staying or exiting the market could be estimated jointly. Such econometric 
models not only allow for testing interaction effects between efficiency and uncertainty, but 
also allow for testing non-monotonic relations between efficiency and exit probability. 
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Appendix 
Lemma : A profit function of the type ߨ௔ሺ݌ǡ࢝ǡ ܽሻ homogeneous of degree െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in input 
prices will be homogeneous of degree ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in output price ݌. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the one in Lau’s chapter in Fuss and McFadden (1978) and 
Kumbhakar (2001). Because the profit function has to be positively linearly homogeneous 
with respect to all output and input prices, by Euler’s theorem:  
(36) σ ௉௜ୀଵ பగೌப௪೔ ݓ௜ ൅
பగೌ
ப௣ ݌ ൌ ߨ௔. 
In addition, we also know that the profit function is homogeneous of degree െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in 
input prices, so that by Euler’s theorem:  
(37) σ ௉௜ୀଵ பగೌப௪೔ ݓ௜ ൌ െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻߨ௔. 
If we substitute (37) in (36) we obtain:  
(38) െ݇Ȁሺͳ െ ݇ሻߨ௔ ൅ பగೌப௣ ݌ ൌ ߨ௔. 
Rearranging, we are able to show that the profit function has to be homogeneous of degree 
ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻ in ݌ by Euler’s theorem:  
(39) பగೌப௣ ݌ ൌ ͳȀሺͳ െ ݇ሻߨ௔Ǥ Ǥ Ǥ 
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